Dr. Paul Chambers Gives Lecture on Thailand’s “Monarchized Military”

On October 13, 2026, Dr. Paul Chambers of Oklahoma University gave an online public lecture on “Thailand’s Influential Military.” This event was co-organized by the Association for Thai Democracy, Engage Thailand, Thais for Human Rights and Democracy, 112 Watch, and the Southeast Asian Research Group, UW-Madison, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the passing of King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

In this lecture, Dr. Chambers examined how the armed forces maintain their influence through ties to the monarchy, internal patronage networks, and cooperation with civilian governments. Chambers argued that Thailand’s military cannot be understood separately from the monarchy. He described their relationship as a “monarchized military”: the armed forces protect the monarchy and help sustain its authority, while royal endorsement legitimizes military power. Chambers argued that this partnership has been particularly important since 1980, and that no successful military coup since then has occurred without the king’s endorsement.

Under King Bhumibol, the monarchy balanced competing military factions while allowing powerful army leaders considerable influence. Under King Vajiralongkorn, Chambers argued, the relationship has become more centralized, with the palace exercising greater direct control over key security units.

How the military has shaped Thai politics

Chambers counted 14 overt military coups since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932 and traced the military’s continued influence through several political turning points.

After the 1992 Black May crackdown, Thailand entered a period of what Chambers described as “guided democracy,” in which the monarchy and military continued to influence politics behind the scenes. Thaksin Shinawatra’s 2001 electoral victory challenged this established order. His efforts to build influence within the police and armed forces threatened existing elite networks, culminating in the 2006 coup.

The military-backed government that followed introduced institutional changes that strengthened its autonomy. The 2008 Defence Act gave senior military officials greater control over officer reshuffles and established a Defence Council dominated by military personnel. The Internal Security Act also revived and strengthened the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which Chambers described as a powerful security institution with broad intelligence, counterinsurgency, and internal security responsibilities.

The 2014 coup and subsequent military government further weakened democratic institutions. The 2017 Constitution restored an appointed Senate and constrained political parties, helping preserve military influence after the return of elections. In 2019, the military-backed Palang Pracharath Party helped former coup leader Prayut Chan-o-cha remain prime minister. Even after Move Forward won the 2023 election, Pita Limjaroenrat was blocked from becoming prime minister, illustrating the limits of electoral power under Thailand’s political system.

Anutin’s government and the military’s resurgence

Chambers described Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul as a “status quo agent” rather than a leader seeking to strengthen civilian control over the armed forces. He argued that Anutin’s government has preserved military privileges and accommodated its institutional interests.

The 2025 Thai–Cambodian border conflict provided an important turning point. According to Chambers, the military recovered some of its public standing after its image had suffered during the 2014–2019 junta period. He cited a poll indicating that 62.5% of respondents trusted the military most to resolve the border crisis. Rising nationalist sentiment also helped the armed forces strengthen their political influence.

After the controversy surrounding former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s phone call with Cambodian leader Hun Sen and her subsequent removal from office, Anutin gave the military considerable latitude over defense spending and procurement, military influence over the National Security Council, border policy, conscription, military business interests, and laws that preserve the armed forces’ autonomy, including the Internal Security Act. Chambers argued that this accommodation benefits Anutin by protecting him from military intervention and allowing him to capitalize on the armed forces’ popularity.

Military factions and patronage networks

A central part of Chambers’ lecture focused on how personal relationships and internal factions shape military appointments and political influence. Factions form around military units, academy classes, regional backgrounds, and personal loyalties. 

Chambers highlighted Pre-Cadet Class 26, whose members occupy several senior military and security positions. He discussed Army Commander General Phana Klaewplodthuk’s influence in placing members of his class in leadership roles and building connections with the younger Class 28. Such networks, Chambers argued, promote cohesion and help determine who advances to the highest positions. The October 2026 reshuffles illustrated how these relationships can shape appointments even under a nominally civilian government.

He also discussed the Kor Daeng (“red-neck”) faction, formed in 2018 as an effort to bring palace-favored officers together under a more unified network. Officers excluded from this group became associated with the Kor Khiao (“green-neck”) faction. The strategy initially strengthened palace influence but also created resentment among excluded officers, leading to changes in the balance between factions.

The First Army Region is especially significant because it is responsible for Bangkok and central Thailand, making it strategically important during coups. Chambers also pointed to changes in military unit structures and the designation of additional units as royal guard forces as evidence of efforts to place the armed forces under more centralized royal control.

The palace’s expanding role in security

Chambers described the Royal Security Command as a key institution linking the monarchy and military. The transfer of the First and Eleventh Infantry Regiments into its structure placed important military units under direct royal control. He suggested that the broader objective was to ensure that military forces based in Bangkok would increasingly fall under the palace’s authority.

Senior figures with military backgrounds also serve as intermediaries between the palace and armed forces. Chambers highlighted General Apirat Kongsompong and General Satitpong Sukvimol, as well as General Chakrapop Pudidet, who holds a senior position in the Royal Security Command. He noted that 10 of the Privy Council’s 20 members are retired senior military officials, underscoring the close institutional links between the two establishments.

However, Chambers cautioned that the Royal Security Command remains relatively small compared with the regular armed forces. Although the palace has expanded its direct control over selected units, bringing the entire military under royal command would be a much greater undertaking.

What comes next?

During the Q&A session, Chambers discussed potential vulnerabilities in the monarchy–military partnership. He suggested that tensions could grow if the palace increasingly demands actions that military officers oppose. He also raised the possibility that the armed forces may seek to preserve their interests through political parties and elections rather than coups, which have become unpopular.

The future relationship could also depend on the next reign. Chambers noted that senior figures in the Privy Council and Royal Household are aging, and that a successor who lacks the current king’s authority could create space for the military to exercise greater independent power.

Finally, Chambers discussed how geopolitical competition between the United States and China could strengthen the military’s position. Concerns about possible Chinese military bases in Laos or Cambodia, he argued, could be used to justify increased defense spending and reinforce claims that the armed forces are essential to national security. He also suggested that the public presentation of Queen Suthida as a military pilot serves both the king’s personal interests and the palace’s broader efforts to strengthen ties between the monarchy and military.

Overall, Chambers’ lecture emphasized that the Thai military’s influence extends far beyond its formal security role. Its relationship with the monarchy, networks of patronage, control over key appointments, institutional autonomy, and ability to benefit from nationalist sentiment all help sustain its political power. These overlapping interests continue to present a major obstacle to democratic reform and meaningful civilian control of the armed forces.